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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from a final order (Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment) of the Third Judicial District Court of and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah (Honorable L.A. Dever). Richard G. Fordham, the 
plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0). The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), transferred this Appeal to this Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)0). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it determined 
that the "Fireman's Rule" prohibits Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim 
against defendant-appellee Ryan Oldroyd and, accordingly, granted 
Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(Standard of Review) 
Summary judgment should be affirmed only if there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact and only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions 
for correctness. E.g., Andreini v. Hultqren, 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993). 
The appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling on appeal of a 
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grant of summary judgment. E.g., Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 
588 (Utah App. 1993). On review of a grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 
(Issue Preserved in Trial Court) 
This issue was preserved in the District Court by Mr. Fordham's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
88-126) and by his counsel's oral argument, presented on March 16, 2005, in 
opposition to that Motion. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
This Appeal, in this case that stems from an incident in which 
Mr. Fordham, a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, was severely injured, is from the 
District Court's order granting Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment 
entered pursuant to the District Court's determination that the "Fireman's Rule" 
prohibits Mr. Fordham from prevailing in this litigation. 
Mr. Fordham alleged, in his Complaint (R. 1-4), that Mr. Oldroyd was 
negligent in connection with the subject incident of December 28, 2003 and 
that, as a proximate cause of Mr. Oldroyd's alleged negligence, Mr. Fordham 
has sustained substantial compensable damages. Mr. Oldroyd in his Answer 
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(R. 7-12) denied those allegations. After limited discovery, including the taking 
of the depositions of Mr. Oldroyd and Mr. Fordham, Mr. Oldroyd filed his 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 39-40) and his Memorandum in support of 
that Motion (R. 41-87). Mr. Fordham submitted his Memorandum in opposition 
to that Motion (R. 88-126), along with a Request for Hearing and Oral 
Argument (R. 127-28). Mr. Oldroyd then submitted his Reply Memorandum in 
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 129-46) and his Request to 
Submit for decision and his own Request for Oral Argument (R. 147-47). 
Oral argument was held on Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on March 16, 2005. At the conclusion of that hearing the District 
Court, announcing its determination that the Fireman's Rule prohibits 
Mr. Fordham from maintaining this action against Mr. Oldroyd for injuries 
sustained when Mr. Fordham was struck by another driver while he was at the 
scene of a rollover accident caused by Mr. Oldroyd's negligence, from the 
bench orally granted Mr. Oldroyd's Motion. That ruling was formalized by the 
District Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
163-64; copy set forth in the Addendum hereto at 01-02). 
This Appeal ensued. 
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 28, 2003, on the (eastbound) 600 South off-ramp 
from 1-15, in Salt Lake City, Mr. Oldroyd allegedly operated a motor vehicle 
negligently and in violation of his duty of care. R. 2; 41-42. 
2. Among other things, Mr. Oldroyd was allegedly driving too fast for 
existing conditions (the roadway surface was snowy and/or icy), failed to 
operate the vehicle he was operating within a single lane, and failed to keep 
that vehicle under control. R. 2; 41-42. As alleged proximate results of 
Mr. Oldroyd's subject negligence, Mr. Oldroyd lost control of his vehicle, that 
vehicle traveled across the traffic lanes to its left, struck a snow bank on the 
left (north) side of the roadway, overturned onto its top, and blocked the 
northern-most off-ramp travel lane. R. 2. 
3. As alleged further proximate results of Mr. Oldroyd's subject 
negligence, Mr. Fordham, a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper who had been called 
to the scene, stopped his Highway Patrol vehicle for traffic control and highway 
safety purposes, in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle that Mr. Oldroyd had 
been operating, and was in the process of getting flares out of the trunk of his 
Highway Patrol vehicle when another person operating another vehicle on the 
same off-ramp encountered ice and/or snow on the roadway and lost control of 
that vehicle, and that vehicle struck Mr. Fordham. R. 2-3; 42. 
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4. As alleged further proximate results of Mr. Oldroyd's alleged 
subject negligence, Mr. Fordham has sustained severe bodily injuries, 
including a leg injury that nearly resulted in amputation; has sustained 
substantial lost income and earning capacity; has sustained substantial 
impairment and disability; has experienced substantial physical and emotional 
pain and suffering; has sustained substantial disfigurement; has sustained 
substantial loss of, and diminution of, enjoyment of various life activities; has 
incurred substantial health care expenses; has sustained a substantial loss of 
his pre-incident ability to provide household services; has sustained and 
incurred additional "special" and "general" damages; and will, in the future, 
sustain and incur substantial additional such damages, all to his damage in 
compensable and reasonable amounts to be determined by the jury herein. 
R. 3. 
5. Prior to filing this action, Mr. Fordham settled with the driver of the 
vehicle that struck him for her liability insurance policy limits of $50,000. 
6. Mr. Fordham was also eligible for, and has received, workers 
compensation benefits. 
7. Mr. Oldroyd has acknowledged that, as he came down the hill 
from the off-ramp, he encountered "black ice," lost control momentarily, then 
regained control, then lost control again, then slid, fishtailing across other 
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lanes of traffic, and his car then hit a snow bank piled up against the barrier on 
the left (north) side of the road and flipped over. R. 156-57. 
8. Mr. Oldroyd saw the other vehicle striking Mr. Fordham. R. 158. 
9. It appeared to Mr. Oldroyd that the experience that the driver of 
the vehicle that struck Mr. Fordham had with the roadway was not exactly like 
his but similar to his, and he believes that the other driver encountered the 
same problem on the roadway that he had encountered and that the other 
driver's experience occurred within about one-half hour of the time that his 
rollover incident had occurred. R. 158-59. 
10. Mr. Oldroyd saw approximately five cars slipping or sliding on the 
roadway between the time of his rollover incident and the time the driver 
whose vehicle struck Mr. Fordham came along, and those cars seemed to 
have about the same kind of initial reaction that his car had had at about the 
same spots on the roadway. R. 159-60. 
11. Those other drivers were able to regain control of their vehicles 
without coming clear across the roadway and striking the snow bank on the left 
side and were able to regain control of their vehicles and just keep going down 
the hill, and there was a mix of SUVs and passenger cars among those 
vehicles. R. 160. 
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12. Mr. Oldroyd had encountered black ice and slush in his previous 
driving experience and knew from his driving experience that, if one 
encountered black ice or slush, there was a potential for one's losing control 
and sliding and perhaps striking a snow bank and perhaps overturning and 
perhaps losing control and hitting other vehicles or persons in the way. R. 
160-61. 
13. It is Mr. Oldroyd's understanding that Mr. Fordham was among 
the officers who arrived at the scene to investigate and assist with 
Mr. Oldroyd's accident. R. 163. 
14. Mr. Oldroyd knew prior to the time of the subject incident that, if 
he should lose control and get into an accident himself (a rollover or some 
other kind), officers of the law would be coming to investigate and assist. R. 
162. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court committed reversible error in summarily dismissing 
Mr. Fordham's claim on the basis of the so-called "Fireman's Rule." 
The sole basis for Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
sole basis for the District Court's granting that Motion was the Fireman's Rule, 
a common-law doctrine that, where accepted and applied to facts such as 
those pertinent to this case, works to prohibit injured public safety officers from 
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prevailing in personal injury actions against those whose negligence causes 
them to be, in the exercise of their job duties, at the scene of incidents in which 
they are injured. The Fireman's Rule has been accepted, to varying degrees 
and in various forms, by the courts of many jurisdictions. It has also been 
rejected outright, or limited in its ambit, in ways that would not prohibit 
Mr. Fordham from prevailing on his claims against Mr. Oldroyd, by courts of 
other jurisdictions. 
This case presents, in Utah, an important issue of first impression. 
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court appears ever to have 
addressed the question of whether a public safety officer (a fire or police 
officer) may maintain a personal injury action against a person whose 
negligence has led to that public safety officer's being present at a scene at 
which he or she is subsequently injured. Neither this Court nor the Utah 
Supreme Court appears ever to have addressed the question of whether 
application of the Fireman's Rule is at odds with the Utah statutory scheme or 
unfairly discriminates against public safety officers. This Court should rule that 
the Fireman's Rule is, indeed, at odds with the Utah statutory scheme; does, 
indeed, unfairly discriminate against public safety officers; and should not be 
deemed to be part of the common law of the State of Utah. This Court should 
reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand this case for trial. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ADOPTING THE FIREMAN'S RULE AND IN DETERMINING 
THAT THAT RULE PROHIBITS MR. FORDHAM FROM 
PURSUING HIS CLAIMS AGAINST MR. OLDROYD. 
The "Fireman's Rule" is a widely rule recognized which, where it is 
followed, prevents firefighters and police officers injured in the course of 
their duties from recovering from those whose negligence proximately 
caused their injuries or from the owner or occupant of premises who is 
responsible for creating the condition requiring their presence on the 
property. The Fireman's Rule has been applied to preclude recovery 
against negligent motorists for injuries sustained by police officers which 
were reasonably foreseeable in the course of their duties on the 
highway. The rule is applicable where a police officer is responding to 
or investigating an automobile accident and where an officer is injured 
as a result of a motorist's actions in negligently stopping on a highway. 
Am.Jur.2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic §691 (emphasis added). R. 43 
(Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
Unlike many courts, the Utah appellate courts appear never to have 
discussed the Fireman's Rule, the sole basis for Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the sole basis on which the District Court granted that 
Motion. 
It appears that there would be no other valid basis for the Motion to have 
been made. First, there is, at a minimum, a question of fact as to whether 
Mr. Oidroyd was negligent in losing control of his vehicle and causing it to roll 
over, and Mr. Oidroyd may have conceded negligence. The Order Granting 
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Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 163-64), prepared by 
Mr. Oldroyd's counsel, states, in part: 
Plaintiff, as a highway patrol trooper, acting in the course and scope of 
his employment, cannot maintain a cause of action against Defendant 
for injuries sustained when he was struck by another driver while at the 
scene of a rollover accident caused by Defendant's negligence. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, there is, at a minimum, a question of fact as to the proximate 
cause connection between Mr. Oldroyd's negligence and the injuries and 
damages sustained by Mr. Fordham. Utah law is clear that an intervening 
negligent act (Mr. Fordham does not dispute the proposition that the driver 
who struck him was negligent) is not necessarily a superseding cause that 
relieves an original actor such as Mr. Oidroyd of liability. The Utah Supreme 
Court has clearly held, in Godeskv v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541, 545 
(Utah 1984): 
The earlier actor is charged with the foreseeable negligent acts of 
others. Therefore, if the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the 
earlier negligent act is a concurring [not superseding] cause. 
See, also, MUJI 3.16, and other cases there cited. It is also a matter of clearly 
established Utah law that the negligence of two or more persons may combine 
to produce an injury and that the negligence of two or more persons may be 
proximate causes of the same injury, in which case the negligent persons must 
share liability, for the subject injuries and damages, in proportion to their 
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individual percentages of negligence. See, e.g., MUJI 3.15 and cases there 
cited. 
Given the similarities between Mr. Oldroyd's driving conduct and losing 
control of his vehicle and the conduct and losing control of her vehicle of the 
driver who struck Mr. Fordham, given such things as the short passage of time 
between Mr. Oldroyd's conduct and that of the other driver, and given 
Mr. Oldroyd's own acknowledgments (see Facts numbered 7-13, set forth at 
pp. 5-7 above), there is clearly, at a minimum, a question of fact as to whether 
Mr. Oldroyd's negligence, was a proximate cause of Mr. Fordham's injuries 
and damages. Mr. Oldroyd apparently acknowledges the correctness of that 
proposition, or else he would be expected to have contested it in his Motion for 
Summary Judgment. It thus appears clear that, unless the District Court's 
determination that the Fireman's Rule prohibits Mr. Fordham from maintaining 
this action against Mr. Oldroyd is affirmed, Mr. Fordham should be allowed to 
present his claim against Mr. Oldroyd to a jury and that the jury should be 
allowed to determine the respective percentages of causal fault of Mr. Oldroyd 
and the driver whose vehicle struck Mr. Fordham, as well as the amounts of 
Mr. Fordham's compensable damages. 
One of the underpinnings of some cases relied on by Mr. Oldroyd in the 
District Court proceedings and on which Mr. Oldroyd is expected to rely in this 
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Appeal is the notion that firefighters and police officers "assume the risk" of 
injuries in connection with their employment.1 It is well-established, however, 
that, in Utah, assumption of risk is not an absolute defense. E.g., Moore v. 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.. 631 P.2d 865, 868-72 (Utah 1981). 
Furthermore, the basic philosophy of Utah tort law and the Liability Reform Act 
of 1986, codified at Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to -43, is that each tortfeasor 
must pay his, her, or its fair share of a plaintiff's damages. The Utah 
Legislature has made no exception to that rule of law for public safety officers, 
and there is no good reason for the courts of the State of Utah to adopt a 
common law exception to that rule. 
Mr. Oldroyd made much, in the District Court proceedings, of the fact 
that Mr. Fordham has received workers compensation benefits, and is 
expected in this Appeal to contend that that fact is somehow relevant to the 
question of whether the Fireman's Rule should be adopted and applied to the 
facts of this case. It is significant, with respect to that proposition, that the 
Utah Legislature has determined that it is permissible for one who receives 
1
 The District Court's Order from which this Appeal is taken concludes with this 
language: 
The Court finds that the type of risk which resulted in injury to 
[Mr. Fordham] is precisely the type of risk [Mr. Fordham] was hired to 
confront as a highway patrol trooper, and the "Fireman's Rule" therefore 
precludes [Mr. Fordham's] claim of negligence against [Mr. Oldroyd]. 
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workers compensation benefits to also pursue a tort claim or claims against 
the person or persons whose negligence has proximately caused the injured 
employee's injuries and damages. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-106 provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable 
under this [workers compensation] chapter... is caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an employer, 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer: 
(b) the injured employee or the employee's heirs or personal 
representative may have an action for damages against the 
third person. 
(Emphasis added.) There is no exception for fire or police officers injured in 
the line of duty, and there is no sound reason for the courts of the State of 
Utah to adopt a rule that would single out firefighters and public safety officers, 
from the universe of private and other public actors, for discriminatory 
treatment. 
Cases from various jurisdictions have rejected the Fireman's Rule 
outright or declined to apply it to situations like the subject situation. For 
example, in Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 1984), the Oregon 
Supreme Court, in the course of reversing a judgment in favor of the 
defendant, stated, after first explaining that the basis for the Fireman's Rule 
had to do with assumption of risk: 
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Implied assumption of risk in both primary and secondary forms 
statutorily has been abolished in this state since 1975, and thus it can 
no longer serve as an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery. [Citations 
omitted.] That fact requires us to reexamine the "fireman's rule" to 
determine whether we can still hold that a fire fighter or police officer 
assumes the risk of another's negligence to the point of absolutely 
barring a public safety officer from recovering in a negligence action. 
When we thus reexamine the "fireman's rule," we find that its major 
theoretical underpinning is gone. Therefore, because the rule is not 
sustainable under implied assumption of risk analysis, we must 
determine if any other supportable theory under the general rubric of 
"policy" will provide the foundation for the rule. The most often cited 
policy considerations include: 1) To avoid placing too heavy a burden 
on premises owners to keep their premises safe from unpredictable 
entrance of firefighters; 2) To spread the risk of the fire fighters' injuries 
to the public through workers' compensation, salary and fringe benefits; 
3) To encourage the public to call for professional help and not rely on 
self-help in emergency situations; 4) To avoid increased litigation.... 
[Citations omitted.] 
Frequently, the so-called policy reasons are merely redraped arguments 
drawn from premises liability or implied assumption of risk, neither of 
which are now available as legal foundations in this state. For example, 
policy consideration " 1 " above focuses on the fire fighter as a class from 
whom the premises owner needs immunity (akin to a licensee or 
trespasser), not on the reasonableness of the activity of the premises 
owner in the circumstances.... 
The remaining policy arguments are equally flawed. The weakness in 
the loss-spreading rationale, "2" above, is obvious. By denying a public 
safety officer recovery from a negligent tortfeasor, the officer is not 
directed to recover his damages from the general public; rather the 
officer is totally precluded from recovering these damages from anyone. 
Contrast this with other public employees who are injured when 
confronting dangers on their jobs. The latter can recover workers' 
compensation and salary benefits from the public, but are also allowed 
additional tort damages from the third-party tort-feasors. Under the 
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"fireman's rule" the injured public safety officer must bear a loss which 
other public employees are not require to bear.... 
As for "3" above, Dean Prosser criticized as "preposterous rubbish" the 
argument offered to defend the "fireman's rule" that tort liability might 
deter landowners from uttering cries of distress in emergency situations. 
[Citations omitted.] We agree. Furthermore we have previously 
rejected "4" above, avoidance of increased litigation, as a ground for 
denying substantive liability. [Citations omitted.] 
As a result of statutory abolition of implied assumption of risk, we hold 
that the "fireman's rule" is abolished in Oregon as a rule of law and no 
longer can bar recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained by a 
public safety officer, in the course of his or her employment, as a result 
of a defendant's negligent conduct. 
Id. at 1216-18 (emphasis added). 
In Banvai v. Arruda. 799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990), the Colorado 
Court of Appeals, in the course of reversing the dismissal of a police officer's 
claim against a driver whose negligence caused a collision and caused the 
officer to be present at the scene, where the officer's vehicle was rearended by 
other drivers, explained: 
We do not view employment as a firefighter or police officer as legal 
acceptance of the negligence of others who expose the officer to injury 
in connection with an automobile accident. This is especially so when 
consideration is given to the fact that other public employees, like 
citizens in general, remain entitled to assert their claims. 
While the officer's special skills, training, and experience may be 
considered with reference to any comparative negligence involved, in 
our view, a per se grant of immunity to those whose negligence creates 
a dangerous situation for the officer is an unwarranted departure from 
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the general duty imposed to exercise due care for the safety of others. 
[Citation omitted.] Thus, we hold that a duty existed in this case for the 
drivers to exercise due care towards Banyai consistent with the law of 
negligence as applied in this state. 
Id. at 443 (emphasis added). 
One of the most eloquent statements of rejection of the Fireman's Rule 
is the following, appearing in the course of the South Carolina Supreme 
Court's answer to a question certified by a federal district court, in Minnich v. 
Med-Waste. Inc.. 564 S.E.2d 98, 103 (S.C. 2002): 
In our view, the tort law of this state adequately addresses negligence 
claims brought against non-employer tortfeasors arising out of injuries 
incurred by firefighters and police officers during the discharge of their 
duties. We are not persuaded by any of the various rationales 
advanced by those courts that recognize the firefighter's rule. The more 
sound public policy -- and the one we adopt -- is to decline to 
promulgate a rule singling out police officers and firefighters for 
discriminatory treatment. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Courts of other states have declined to apply the Fireman's Rule to 
situations other than those that originally gave rise to the rule (those in which 
injured firemen sought to obtain tort recovery from those to whose premises 
they were summoned in emergency situations and subsequently injured). In 
Lave v. Neumann. 317 N.W.2d 779 (Neb. 1982), the plaintiff, a policeman, was 
injured when he ran after a truck that had started moving after having been 
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negligently left on the street by the defendant. The Nebraska Supreme Court 
held, in the course of affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff: 
The reasons which justify the application of the fireman's rule in cases 
where firemen were injured in fires involving personal property are the 
same reasons which support the rule in fires involving real property. A 
similar analogy cannot be made as to policemen iniured while 
performing their duty not on private premises. 
We see no reason why, under the facts of this case, a policeman iniured 
in the performance of his duty, by the negligence of another, has any 
less right to be compensated for his injuries than a person not a 
policeman. 
Id. at 782 (emphasis added). 
In Levandoski v. Cone, 841 A.2d 208 (Conn. 2004), the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held, in the course of affirming a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff: 
The common-law "firefighter's rule" provides, in general terms, that a 
firefighter or police officer who enters private property in the exercise of 
his duties occupies the status of a licensee and, therefore, is owed a 
duty of care by the property owner that is less than that owed to an 
ordinary invitee. [Citations omitted.] Thus, under the firefighter's rule, 
the landowner generally owes the firefighter or police officer injured on 
his property "only the duty not to injure him willfully or wantonly ...." The 
principle issue in this appeal is whether the firefighter's rule should be 
extended beyond the scope of premises liability so as to bar a police 
officer from recovering, based on a claim of ordinary negligence, from a 
tortfeasor who is neither an owner nor a person in control of the 
premises. The defendant, who is not a landowner or a person in control 
of land, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a jury trial, 
in favor of the plaintiff, a police officer who was iniured by the 
defendant's negligent conduct on the land of another person. We 
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conclude that the firefighter's rule should not be so extended and, 
accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
As demonstrated by these cases, the appellate courts of the State of 
Utah would not be unique in rejecting the discriminatory Fireman's Rule 
outright or as applied to the facts2 of this case. 
It may also be worth noting that the jurisdictions that apply the Fireman's 
Rule implicitly or expressly make a distinction between those whose 
negligence creates the situation to which fire or police officers respond and 
those whose negligence (like that of the driver who struck Mr. Fordham) is the 
more immediate cause of harm. If the Fireman's Rule is consistently applied, 
based on its supposed policy underpinnings such as assumption of risk, the 
officers' working for all the taxpayers, and the proposition that workers 
compensation benefits are, in any event, available to public safety officers 
injured on the job, there should be no such distinction; and the Fireman's Rule 
should, if it is applied consistently, work to prohibit public safety officers from 
suing anyone for any injuries negligently inflicted on them in the course of their 
2
 Mr. Fordham was injured when he was struck by a vehicle on a public 
highway and not while he was fighting a fire or responding to a fire on 
Mr. Oldroyd's property. The hoariest basis for invocation of the Fireman's 
Rule is thus clearly lacking in this case. 
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job duties. And yet no court seems to hew to the proposition that a police 
officer such as Mr. Fordham is unable to proceed against a person who (like 
the driver who struck Mr. Fordham) negligently injures him after he arrives at 
the scene to assist in a situation caused by an earlier negligent actor such as 
Mr. Oidroyd.3 This is so although there is, when one considers the concept of 
creation of risk and how broadly and in how many differing situations that 
concept is addressed in Utah tort law, no meaningful distinction between the 
risk created by someone who negligently sets up a potentially dangerous 
situation and the person whose negligence is the more immediate cause of the 
injury. For a public safety officer risks his or her safety, as an inherent part of 
his or her job, is paid by the taxpayers, and may recover workers 
compensation benefits, regardless of whether he or she is injured by the 
person whose negligence occasions his or her presence, the negligence of the 
person whose vehicle strikes him or her, or a combination of both. 
3
 Mr. Oidroyd has so acknowledged, in his Reply Memorandum in support of 
his Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted in the District Court 
proceedings: 
The Fireman's Rule precludes suit only against a citizen whose ordinary 
negligence occasioned the presence of the public safety officer. 
Independent acts of negligence that injure a safety officer at the scene, 
such as the negligence of... the driver who struck and injured 
Mr. Fordham, are not insulated from suit. 
R. 132. 
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The Fireman's Rule did not prohibit Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim 
against the driver who struck him even though one of the risks of his 
employment was that he might be struck by such a person. And yet the 
Fireman's Rule, as adopted and applied by the courts of some states and as 
adopted and applied by the District Court in this case, works to prohibit 
Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim against Mr. Oldroyd. That inconsistency 
appears to constitute another problem with the putative wisdom of the Rule 
and constitutes another reason for this Court to decline to adopt it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Fireman's Rule is at odds with the principle at the heart of Utah tort 
law that each tortfeasor should bear his, her, or its fair share of responsibility, 
as determined by a jury, for damages his, her, or its negligence has 
proximately caused another. Also, adoption of the Rule by the appellate 
courts of Utah would amount to unfair discrimination against Utah public safety 
officers; the Rule does not apply to private persons and it does not apply to 
other public employees. Nor do the various reasons offered in support of the 
Rule appear to hold water. Assumption of the risk is not an absolute defense 
but should be viewed under the umbrella of comparative fault. The fact that 
Mr. Fordham, like other public safety officers injured in the course of their job 
duties, is paid by the taxpayers and the fact that he has received workers 
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compensation benefits have no pertinent legal significance. Furthermore, the 
Rule's prohibition of claims against those whose negligence causes peace 
officers to be at scenes where they are injured but non-prohibition of claims 
against those whose negligence more directly causes injury is illustrative of its 
logical weakness. 
This Court should rule (for reasons such as those articulated by the 
courts in Christensen (pp. 13-15), Banvai (pp. 15-16), and Minnich (p. 16), 
above) that there is no need or good public policy reason for any aspect of the 
Fireman's Rule to be made part of Utah common law. Alternatively, the Court 
should decline to apply the Fireman's Rule to the facts of this case and rule 
(similar to the holdings of the Lave and Levandoski cases discussed at pp. 16-
18, above) that Mr. Fordham may proceed with his claim against Mr. Oldroyd. 
This Court should, in any event, reverse the Summary Judgment so that 
this case may proceed to trial and so that the jury may decide questions that 
jurors typically decide in personal injury negligence actions (including, if 
Mr. Oldroyd cares to pursue such a contention, and if there is sufficient 
evidence to support such a contention, Mr. Fordham's own supposed 
negligence in doing what he was doing). 
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Respectfully submitted this Zl^ day of June, 2005. 
PETER C. COLLINS 
PETER C. COLLINS, L L C . 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD G. FORDHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RYAN OLDROYD, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040910717 PI 
Judge L.A. Dever 
THE COURT, having considered Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
dated January 7, 2005, together with memoranda submitted by counsel for all parties, 
and the Court having entertained oral argument on the motion, hereby ORDERS that 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Court finds that 
summary judgment is appropriate pursuant to the provisions of the "Fireman's Rule". 
Plaintiff, as a highway patrol trooper, acting in the course and scope of his 
employment, cannot maintain a cause of action against Defendant for injuries 
sustained when he was struck by another driver while at the scene of a rollover 
accident caused by Defendant's negligence. The Court finds that the type of risk 
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which resulted in injury to the Plaintiff is precisely the type of risk Plaintiff was hired 
to confront as a highway patrol trooper, and the "Fireman's Rule" therefore precludes 
Plaintiff's claim of negligence against Defendant. 
ORDERED this ] ^ daY of M W O f V ^ , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
LA . Dever ' ^ ^ 
Third Distfkrf Cg^rtBjudge 
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Peter C. Cfrttins, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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